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ABSTRACT
Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mecha-
nism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms. We intro-
duce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (strategy-proof)
mechanism for selecting an influential vertex in a directed graph
(e.g. Twitter’s network). The goal is to devise a mechanism with a
bounded ratio between the maximal influence and the influence of
the selected user, and in which no user can improve its probabil-
ity of being selected by following or unfollowing other users. We
introduce the Two Path mechanism which is based on the idea of
selecting the vertex that is the first intersection of two independent
random walks in the network. The Two Path mechanism is incen-
tive compatible on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), and has a finite
approximation ratio on natural subfamilies of DAGs. Simulations
indicate that this mechanism is suitable for practical uses.
KEYWORDS
social networks, diffusion, strategy-proof, mechanism design
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of selecting influential users in a network, has been
extensively studied in the past decade ([22, 24, 25]). These works
mainly focus on the problem of maximizing diffusion in a given
network. If we assume that users of the network are willing to
be selected by the mechanism, it is desirable that the selection
mechanism will not only have good diffusion performance, but
also be incentive compatible; namely, that a user could not affect
his probability of being selected by strategic erasure (or formation)
of links. For instance, suppose that Twitter would like to start a
new epidemic trend. It would like to find a very influential user
and give him some benefit in order to kickoff its campaign. If the
users are aware of these intents, they might remove or add out-
going links in order to get chosen. A similar problem would be to
select an academic paper in a particular field and awarding it as ‘the
most influential’ in this field; measuring the influence according to
quotes from other papers and taking into account both direct and
propagated influence.
The following simple example demonstrates the tendency be-
tween diffusion maximization and incentive compatibility.
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A directed edge from u to v indicates that u follows (or cites)
v . In any plausible diffusion model, the most influential vertex in
network G1 is A, while the most influential vertex in network G2
is C . Suppose the mechanism simply selects the most influential
vertex. Then userC , knowing that the network isG1, might have an
incentive not to follow user A (although she is interested in user’s
A content) in order to be selected by the mechanism.
As a first step towards understanding incentive compatible dif-
fusion mechanisms, our main focus in this paper is on the problem
of selecting a single user when the graph is acyclic. Note that in en-
vironments where users arrive in horological order (e.g., scientific
papers or scale-free networks; see, for example, [10, 11]) acyclic
graphs are indeed a good proxy for the actual environment.
One of the simplest ideas to develop mechanisms (hopefully
incentive compatible) that select vertices with (hopefully) high
diffusion is the following: choose a node v1 (at random) and ask
him tomention a single userv2 that he follows. Informally speaking,
by arguments in the spirit of the friendship paradox ([13, 21]), we
expect thatv2 will have better diffusion thanv1. We can then askv2
who is his friend, etcetera. Thus, proceeding along a path increases
(in expectation) the influence of the observed user. Two obstacles
arise with this idea:
• When do we stop the process?
• What if a node reports that he does not follow anyone?1.
The Two Path mechanism that we suggest is based on this simple
idea, but instead of tracking a single path, it tracks two. Regarding
the first obstacle, we now have a natural candidate for the selected
user — the first intersection of the two paths. Regarding the second
obstacle, if both paths have ended without intersecting, we simply
re-execute the process with a modification that all the already
tracked users cannot be selected (this is needed for the incentive
compatibility). Note that the (informally) presented mechanism is
very simple for implementation in practical settings and it requires
only partial knowledge about the network (i.e., full revelation of
information by all users is not needed).
Our results are as follows. In Proposition 3.1 we show that the
Two Path mechanism is indeed incentive compatible on DAGs. In
Theorem 3.3 we show that the Two Path mechanism performs
1Note that we cannot stop and select him, as this will incentive every node to report
that he follows no one.
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very well on trees and achieves an approximation ratio of 1.5. In
Theorem 3.5 we show that for forests which are balanced (see
Definition 3.6) the Two Path mechanism achieves a constant ap-
proximation ratio2. However, on DAGs (even balanced), the Two
Path mechanism might not perform so well, as demonstrated in
Example 4.1. In Section 4 we develop a mechanism that is based on
the analysis of the distribution induced by Two Path, and achieve
a constant approximation ratio for DAGs that are both balanced,
andmonotone (i.e., DAGs in which a user is always more influential
than his followers; see Theorem 4.4). In Section 5 we extend the
Two Path mechanism to an incentive-compatible mechanism for
general networks. Test results of this extension and of the Two
Path mechanism on simulated scale-free graphs are presented in
Section 6.
1.1 Related work
Our work is a merger of two branches of literature. Namely, the
study of incentive-compatible (IC) selection mechanisms and the
study of diffusion models in networks. In this paper we offer, for
the first time, IC mechanisms which try to maximize the overall
diffusion.
1.1.1 Incentive-compatible mechanisms. Incentive compatibility
has been studied in many different contexts. The most relevant
to ours are the following. Alon et al. ([2]) and Fischer and Klimm
([14]) studied incentive compatible mechanisms in networks. The
goal there is to select a vertex with a good approximation to the
maximal in-degree. The in-degree can be viewed as a "one-step
diffusion". In our work, on the other hand, we focus on a more
complex diffusion process. Holzman and Moulin ([18]) introduced
an axiomatic approach to the problem of selecting a prize winning
paper based on peer-reviews. In their model, each agent reports one
other nominee for a prize and the mechanism selects one winner
based on these votes. They presented a set of desirable features
a selection mechanism should posses, and asked which subsets
of these features we may/ may not have together with incentive-
compatibility. Their paper focuses on self-selection of a winner,
which again can be viewed as "one-step diffusion".
More recent works with the same theme can be found in Kurokawa
et al. ([20]), Aziz et al. ([5]) and Tamura ([23]).
1.1.2 Diffusion in networks. The diffusion of information in net-
works (and more specifically, social networks) has been extensively
studied ever since the seminal paper of Kempe, Kleinberg and Tar-
dos ([19]). This literature focuses on maximization of diffusion in a
given network. In our work we assume that the designer is unaware
of the network structure, and asks this information from the users.
In [19], the authors have presented two diffusion models — linear
threshold and independent cascade, and offered an algorithm to
select a k-subset of the vertices. Their purpose was to show an
algorithmically-efficient (i.e., polynomial) mechanism with a finite
approximation ratio, but not necessarily IC.
Our influence model relates the influence of vertex x over vertex
y to the probability of reaching x in a random walk starting at y.
Using random walks to measure popularity/influence is not new
either: Gualdi, Medo and Zhang ([17]) used the same influence
2The balanceness condition is necessary as demonstrated in Example 3.8.
model to rank the influence of academic papers (in their model the
graph is acyclic); the popular search engine, Google, uses random
walks in its ranking algorithm, called PageRank ([8]); and Andersen
et al. ([3]) used random walk in their suggestion of a trust-based
recommendation system.
Further reading on networks, their structures and dynamics can be
found in the monograph of Easley and Kleinberg ([12]) and in [7].
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Network and Diffusion
A network is a directed graph G(V ,E), where a vertex is a Twitter
user (academic paper) and an edge from y to x means that y follows
(quotes) x . We denote the in-neighbours (followers) and the out-
neighbours (followees) of vertex x by
N (x) := {v ∈ V |(v,x) ∈ E}; F (x) := {v ∈ V |(x ,v) ∈ E},
respectively, and its out-degree by do (x) = |F (x)|. Our notion of
diffusion is defined as follows. We denote by Py,x the family of all
simple paths (no vertex repetition) from y to x . The influence of x
on y is defined to be
I (x ,y) :=

∑
P ∈Py,x
∏
(i, j)∈P
1
do (i) , x , y
1, x = y
,
and the total influence of x is
I (x) :=
∑
y∈V
I (x ,y).
As we explain below, this diffusion model neatly relates the influ-
ence of a user to the probability of reaching it in a random walk,
and is closely related to other well studied models of diffusion.
The rational behind our notion of diffusion is as follows.
If y follows only x , then he is a groupie fan of x and there is a
high probability that he will be affected by any trend introduced by
x . If on the other hand, y follows x and some other 99 users, then
x ’s influence over y is much lower. Moreover, if x influences y and
y in turn influences z, then x has some indirect influence over z.
Concretely, we assume that each user divides its attention uniformly
between those he follows. A message from user x diffuses along
each path backwards with probability equal to the multiplication of
the ‘attention’ on the edges.
To gain some intuition about the notion of diffusion, we demon-
strate an example of a network and calculate the influence of each
vertex.
Example 2.1. Consider the following Twitter network with six
nodes.
A B
C D E
F
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
The edges weights in blue denote the ‘attention fraction’ of this link.
For example, node E follows D and B, thus each link has a weight
2
of 1/2. Suppose that node A posts a tweet with a recommendation
for a new product. Our model assumes that with probability 1/3
node C will be affected. If C is affected, then with probability 1 D
is affected. If D is affected, then with probability 1/2 E is affected.
Node F will either be affected directly fromC or fromC through D,
thus his probability to be affected fromA is 1/3. We get that starting
withA, the expected diffusion is 2 16 (1 forA, 1/3 forC,D, F and 1/6
for E). Similarly, the influence of C:
I (C,A) = I (C,B) = 0; I (C,C) = I (C,D) = 1; I (C,E) = 1 · 12 =
1
2 ;
I (C, F ) = 12 + 1 ·
1
2 = 1;⇒ I (C) = 3
1
2 .
The influence of the rest of the nodes:
I (B) = 2 23 ; I (D) = 2; I (E) = 1; I (F ) = 1 56 .
We note here the relation of our influence measurement to other
popular measures.
(1) A random path is a path generated by selecting a vertex uni-
formly at random and ‘walking’ a random walk; each time
selecting an out-edge uniformly at random, and stopping when
we reach a previously visited vertex or a vertex with no out-
edges. We can equivalently define I (x) to be the probability of
visiting x in a random path, multiplied by |V |.
(2) The progeny of vertex x is the number of vertices which has a
path to x (excluding x ). IfG is a forest, then I (x) is the progeny of
x plus one. Moreover, for any G, let G ′ ⊆ G be a random graph
generated by picking for each vertex, uniformly at random, one
of its out-edges, and removing the rest of its edges. Then I (x) is
the expected progeny of x in G ′ plus one.
(3) Google’s PageRank ([8]) is an algorithm which takes as input
a digraph G, and a damping factor d ∈ [0, 1], and outputs a
probability distribution on V (G); this distribution represents
the likelihood that an infinite random walk will arrive at any
particular vertex. At each step, with probability d the random
walk continues, and with probability 1−d it jumps to a random
vertex. Denote the PageRank value of x with damping factor 1
by PR(x). Then PR(x) can be expressed as ([1])
PR(x) =
∑
y∈N (x )
PR(y)
do (y) .
If G is an acyclic directed graph (DAG), then we can relate the
influence of x to the influence of its neighbours,
I (x) = 1 +
∑
y∈N (x )
I (y)
do (y) .
The similarity of these two equations is visible. For example, we
can deduce that they induce the same ranking. For any k define
I (k )(x) = I (x)/k . Clearly I (k) induces the same ranking as I ; but
I (k)(x) = 1
k
+
∑
y∈N (x )
I (k )(y)
do (y) ,
and as k →∞, this definition converges to that of PR.
(4) Finally, consider the Independent Cascade model for diffusion
([15, 16, 19]). Independent Cascade is defined for weighted di-
graphs with weights in the interval [0, 1]. If we take a random
graphG ′ ⊆ G by taking each edge independently with probabil-
ity equal to its weight, then the Independent-Cascade diffusion
measure of x is the expected progeny of x in G ′ plus 1. To see
the difference from our model, consider the graph with two
vertices x ,y, and two edges from y to x , each with weight 1/2.
Our model will give x an influence value of 2 (one for itself
and one for y), while the Independent-Cascade score of x is 134
(since there is only 3/4 chance that it will reach y).
2.2 Incentive Compatibility
Next, we define what is a selection mechanism and the properties
we will be interested in.
Definition 2.2. A selection mechanism M is a function which
gives for every G(V ,E) a probability distribution on V ∪ {∅}.
The empty-set value, ∅, means that the mechanism has not se-
lected any vertex. We denote by Pr(M(G) = x) the probability
that the mechanism picks x ∈ V ∪ {∅} when the input is G, and
by E[M(G)] = E[I (M(G))] the expected influence of the selected
vertex3. When it is clear from the context what is the graph G, we
sometimes just write Pr(M = x) and E[M]. Let I∗ = max
v ∈V (G)
I (v)
be the maximal influence in G, and v∗ = {v ∈ V (G) : I (v) = I∗} be
the set of optimal vertices.
Assume that Pr(M = x) is also the payoff function of x . We would
like our mechanism to be such that for any x ∈ V (G), it is a best
action to report its true out-edges. In addition, we would like our
mechanism to give a bounded ratio between the maximal influence
and the expected influence of the selected vertex. Our main mecha-
nism will be intended for the subfamily of directed graphs (DAGs);
meaning, that only when the reported graph is in this subfamily,
we require that it is IC and has bounded ratio.
Definition 2.3. A selectionmechanismM for the family of graphs
G is:
• incentive-compatible (IC), if∀G ∈ G and∀x ∈ V (G), Pr(M(G) =
x) = max
G′∈Gx
Pr(M(G ′) = x), where Gx is the family of all
graphs we get from G by adding and removing outgoing
edges of x4;
• efficient with approx. ratio R, if ∀G ∈ G, I
∗
E[M(G)] ≤ R.
We consider the following four nested families.
Definition 2.4. Let G be a directed graph.
• G is a tree if there is a unique vertex, called the root, with
no out edges and the rest of the vertices have precisely one
out-edge.
• G is a forest if it is a disjoint union of trees.
• G is monotone5 if for any edge (x ,y) ∈ E(G), I (x) < I (y).
• G is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) if it contains no cycles.
3We take I (∅) = 0 in the calculation of the expectation.
4Note that we do not require Gx ⊆ G.
5Observe that a forest is always monotone, and that a monotone graph is acyclic.
3
3 THE TWO PATH MECHANISM
We will now present the algorithm of the Two Path mechanism,
which we denote M2p . A random path is a random walk which
starts at a random vertex, and ends when we reach a vertex with no
out-edges or when we return to a previously visited vertex. The idea
of the Two Path mechanism is to start two independent random
paths from two randomly chosen vertices. If they intersect on an
‘unmarked’ vertex, it is selected; if they intersect on a ‘marked’
vertex, the mechanism returns ‘null’; if they do not intersect, all
the vertices in these paths are marked, and the mechanism repeats.
After presenting the algorithm we will prove it is IC in the family
of DAGs; we will then analyse its approximation ratio in the family
of trees and in the family of forests.
1: U ← ∅
2: whileU , V do
3: Pick x ∈ V uniformly at random
4: P1 ← random path starting at x
5: Pick y ∈ V uniformly at random
6: P2 ← random path starting at y
7: if P1 ∩ P2 = ∅ then
8: U ← U ∪ P1 ∪ P2
9: else
10: z ← the first6 vertex in P1 ∩ P2
11: if z ∈ U then
12: return ∅
13: else
14: return z
15: end if
16: end if
17: end while
Proposition 3.1. MechanismM2p is IC in the family of DAGs.
Proof. Notice that a vertex can be selected only in the first stage
in which it is queried for its out-edges (afterwards it will either be
selected or marked). It is enough, then, to show that in the first time
a vertex is reached by one of the random paths, reporting its true
edges is a best action. Suppose P1 reaches vertex v and we query
for its out-edges for the first time. Vertex v can only be selected
if P2 reaches it before it reaches any other vertex of P1. Since G
has no cycles, a true report by v will lead to vertices which can be
reached by P2 only after P2 has ‘missed’ v . Hence reporting its true
edges cannot hurt its chances of being selected. Surely, reporting
additional edges cannot help it. If P2 reaches an unmarked vertex
u, then either u is already selected (if u ∈ P1) or it will never be
selected regardless of the edges it reports. Hence this mechanism
is incentive compatible. □
MechanismM2p is generally not IC when the graph contains
cycles, as demonstrated by the next example.
Example 3.2. Take the graph with two vertices, x ,y, and two
edges (x ,y), (y,x). Since P1 always includes both vertices, the win-
ner will be determined by the starting vertex of P2. However, if we
remove the edge (x ,y), then x will be selected when either P1 or P2
starts from x . Thus x has an incentive to remove its edge to y.
6First according to the path P1 .
3.1 Two Path on the family of trees
WhenG is a tree, every two paths intersect, and mechanismM2p is
guaranteed to return a vertex in the first stage. SupposeG is a path
of length n. The mechanism then returns either x or y, whichever
is further along the path. Thus, the expected result in this case is
2n/3. In the next theorem we show that this is the worse scenario
whenG is a tree. Hence, we find that the exact approximation ratio
on trees is 1.5. This theorem is fundamental for the proof of the
bound of the approximation ratio on forests (Theorem 3.5).
Theorem 3.3. In the family of all trees, RM2p = 1.5.
Proof. For a vertex v we denote by Tv the subtree which is
under v . Since all the vertices, except the root, have one out-edge,
I (v) = |Tv |. Vertex v ∈ V is selected if and only if x ,y ∈ Tv and
they are not in the same proper subtree of Tv . We get:
Pr(M2p = v) = Pr(x ,y ∈ Tv ) −
∑
u ∈N (v)
Pr(x ,y ∈ Tu )
=
(
I (v)
n
)2
−
∑
u ∈N (v)
(
I (u)
n
)2
.
E[M2p ] =
∑
v ∈V
I (v) Pr(v) = 1
n2
∑
v ∈V
©­«I3(v) − I (v)
∑
u ∈N (v)
I2(u)ª®¬
=
1
n2
©­«
∑
v ∈V
I3(v) −
∑
v ∈V \root
I2(v) · I (F (v))ª®¬
=
1
n2
©­«n3 −
∑
v ∈V \root
I2(v)(I (F (v)) − I (v))ª®¬ .
We define the function f from the family of all trees of order n to
N+ by:
f (T ) =
∑
v ∈V (T )\root
I2(v)(I (F (v)) − I (v)).
Lemma 3.4. Let Pn be the path with n vertices. Then,
Pn = argmax
T is a tree of order n
f (T ).
We will first show that the lemma completes the proof. Indeed,
if f (G) is maximized when G is a path, then E[M2p ] is minimized
in this case. When G is a path, the mechanism will always return
either x or y, whichever is further along the path. The expected
value of the mechanism in this case is, therefore, the expected
value ofmax(a,b), where a,b are two independent, integral random
variables, uniformly distributed in [1,n]. We get
E[M2p ] =
n∑
i=1
i
(
2i − 1
n2
)
=
1
n2
· n(n + 1)(4n − 1)6 ≥
2
3n =
2
3 I
∗.
(1)
In fact, E[M2p ]/n n→∞−−−−→ 23 , hence we have found the exact value
of RM2p in trees. □
It remains to prove the lemma.
4
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Let G be any tree of order n which max-
imizes f (T ). Assume for contradiction that G is not a path. Then
there is a vertexv such that there are two paths:A = {a1, . . . ,ak ,v},
B = {b1, . . . ,bℓ ,v} such thata1,b1 are leafs and {a2, . . . ,ak ,b2, . . . ,bℓ}
all have in-degrees one. Let G ′ be the tree in which we remove the
edge (ak ,v) and add the edge (ak ,b1). It is enough to show that
f (G ′) > f (G). Notice that the only vertices which have different
contribution to the sums in f (G) and f (G ′) are ak (since I (F (ak ))
is different) and b1, . . . ,bl . Hence,
f (G) − f (G ′) = [I2(ak )I (F (ak ))]|G − [I2(ak )I (F (ak ))]|G′
+
ℓ∑
i=1
{[I2(bi )(I (F (bi )) − I (bi ))]|G − [I2(bi )(I (F (bi )) − I (bi ))]|G′}
= [I2(ak )I (v)]|G − [I2(ak )I (b1)]|G′
+
ℓ−1∑
i=1
{[I2(bi )(I (bi+1) − I (bi ))]|G − [I2(bi )(I (bi+1) − I (bi ))]|G′}
+ [I2(ℓ)(I (v) − I (ℓ))]|G − [I2(ℓ)(I (v) − I (ℓ))]|G′
= k2(k + ℓ + 1) − k2(k + 1)
+
ℓ−1∑
i=1
[(
i2(i + 1 − i) − (k + i)2(k + i + 1 − (k + i)
)]
+ ℓ2(k + ℓ + 1 − ℓ) − (k + ℓ)2(k + ℓ + 1 − k − ℓ)
= k2ℓ −
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(k2 + 2ki) + ℓ2(k + 1) − (k + ℓ)2
= k2 − kℓ(ℓ − 1) + ℓ2(k + 1) − (k + ℓ)2
= −kℓ < 0. □
3.2 Two Path on the family of forests
Let G be a forest. Denote by S ⊆ V (G) the set of roots of G. We
denote s = |S |. Suppose s is ‘large’, e.g. s = √n. Then in a single
stage, there is a high probability that the two random paths will
be in different trees and those two paths will be marked. We claim,
however, that if the distribution of the orders of the trees is reason-
ably concentrated near the average, there is a positive probability
that the first time the two paths intersect, they will be intersected in
a tree in which no vertex is marked. This will imply, together with
Theorem 3.3, a bound on the approximation ratio. To be precise,
define
I =
∑
r ∈S I (r )
s
=
n
s
,
the average influence of the sinks. We will prove the following.
Theorem 3.5. For any forest G,
E[M2p (G)] ≥ 0.09n
s
.
We define the following measure for the balance of a forest.
Definition 3.6. For α ∈ (0, 1], a forest G is α-balanced if,
I
I∗ =
n/s
I∗ ≥ α .
This definition formally captures the idea of ‘reasonable distri-
bution’ of the trees’ orders mentioned above. Thus Theorem 3.5
implies the following bound on the approximation ratio.
Corollary 3.7. In the family of α-balanced forests,
RM2p ≤ 1/0.09α .
Note that our purpose here is to show that the approximation
ratio can be finitely-bounded using a natural parameter of the graph.
Although our theoretical bound of 1/α might be quite high, our
simulations in Section 6 demonstrate that the actual approximation
ratio in natural classes of networks is usually low.
Before turning to the proof, we show in the next example that
indeed when α → 0 the approximation ratio of M2p cannot be
bounded.
Example 3.8. Consider a forest made of one star of order
√
n and
n isolated vertices.
x
1 2
√
n 1 2 n
The centre of the star, x , will only be selected if both paths hit the
star for the first time on the same stage. With high probability, this
event will not happen7; hence, the result will be either ∅ or a vertex
with influence one.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. For any r ∈ S , we denote byTr the tree
of r . We define Ar to be the event that the mechanism has picked a
vertex from Tr without marking r before. That is, Ar is the event
that the first time the two paths meet, they meet in Tr , and none of
the paths in previous stages was inTr . From Theorem 3.3 we know
that
E[M2p |Ar ] ≥ 23 I (r ).
Denote the probability that the two paths intersect in a single stage
by Z = Pr(P1 ∩ P2 , ∅) = ∑r ∈S (I (r )/n)2. Let qr be the probability
that in a single stage, the two paths did not intersect and none of
them was in Tr . Then,
qr ≥ (1 − Z )(1 − 2I (r )/n) ≥ 1 − Z − 2I (r )/n,
and,
Pr(Ar ) =
∞∑
k=0
qkr
(
I (r )
n
)2
=
I2(r )
n2(1 − qr ) ≥
I2(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) .
Now, since the events {Ar }r ∈S are pairwise disjoint, we may bound
E[M2p ] ≥
∑
r ∈S
Pr(Ar )E[M2p |Ar ] ≥ 23
∑
r ∈S
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) . (2)
In order to bound the last sum, we partition S to two parts:
S1 = {r ∈ S : Z ≤ I (r )/n}; S2 = S\S1,
7At the first round the probability that x will be selected is O (n−1), whereas the
probability that x will be marked isO (n−1/2). Same is true for all the first n3/4 rounds.
Therefore, the probability that x will be selected during at the first n3/4 rounds is
o(n−1/4), while the probability that it will be marked is close to 1.
5
and bound this sum for each part separately.
2
3
∑
r ∈S1
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) ≥
2
3
∑
r ∈S1
I3(r )
n2I (r )/n + 2nI (r ) =
2n
9
∑
r ∈S1
(
I (r )
n
)2
;
2
3
∑
r ∈S2
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) ≥
2
3
∑
r ∈S2
I3(r )
n2Z + 2n2Z
≥ 2n9Z
∑
r ∈S2
(
I (r )
n
)3
≥ 2n
9Z
√
s
©­«
∑
r ∈S2
(
I (r )
n
)2ª®¬
3/2
.
Where the last inequality is due to the convexity of x3/2. Let δ be
the solution of (1 − δ )3/2 = δ . Since Z = ∑r ∈S (I (r )/n)2, either∑
r ∈S1 (I (r )/n)2 ≥ δZ or
∑
r ∈S2 (I (r )/n)2 ≥ (1 − δ )Z . In the former
case we bound
E[M2p ] ≥ 2n9
∑
r ∈S1
(
I (r )
n
)2
≥ 2nδZ9 ,
and in the latter case we bound
E[M2p ] ≥ 2n9Z√s
©­«
∑
r ∈S2
(
I (r )
n
)2ª®¬
3/2
≥ 2n((1 − δ )Z )
3/2
9Z
√
s
=
2nδ
√
Z
9
√
s
.
Since
∑
r ∈S I (r ) = n, we can use convexity to bound Z ,
Z =
∑
r ∈S
(
I (r )
n
)2
≥ 1
s
(∑
r ∈S
I (r )
n
)2
=
1
s
.
Hence, we get that in any case,
E[M2p ] ≥ 2δn9s ≈
2 · 0.43 · n
9s ≥ 0.09
n
s
. □
4 MECHANISM FOR MONOTONE DAGS
We remind that we define a monotone graph to be a graph in
which any user is more influential than his followers. Clearly, a
monotone graphmust be acyclic. Monotonicity is a natural property
in domains where the statement "my friend is more influential than
I am" is true for any vertex.
Let G be a DAG. Denote by S ⊆ V (G) the set of sinks of G, i.e. the
set of vertices with no out-edges. Denote s = |S |. In a forest, S is the
set of roots and, as we proved in Theorem 3.5, E[M2p (G)] ≥ cn/s
for a constant c > 0. The next example shows that this claim
is not true for all monotone DAGs. We will show later in this
section a mechanism which is somewhat related toM2p , and which
generalizes Theorem 3.5 for monotone DAGs.
Example 4.1. Consider amatrix ofn3/4×n1/4 vertices and another
vertex, v0. Suppose each vertex in row 1 ≤ i ≤ n3/4 − 1 has an edge
to every vertex in row i + 1, and the vertices of row n3/4 all have a
single edge to vertex v0.
v0
n3/4, 1 n3/4, 2 n3/4, n1/4
2, 1 2, 2 2,n1/4
1, 1 1, 2 1,n1/4
The vertices of row i all have influence i , and vertexv0 has influence
n + 1. Thus, this graph is monotone. Since v0 is the only sink,
I = (n + 1)/s = n + 1 = I∗. However, Pr(M2p (v0)) n→∞−−−−→ 0.
Indeed, with high probability, both x ,y will be somewhere in the
first n3/4 − n1/2 rows of the matrix. Since, for each of the top n1/2
rows the random paths P1, P2 have an independent probability of
n−1/4 to intersect, we get that with high probability the two paths
will intersect before reaching v0. We therefore get that for this
monotone DAG, the Two Path mechanism does not have a bounded
approximation ratio.
The mechanism which we are about to suggest for monotone
DAGs, will not be described as an algorithmic procedure, but rather
as an explicit distribution formula. We obtain this formula by first
finding an explicit expression for the distribution of M2p , and
then generalizing it in a natural way to monotone DAGs. We start
by finding the distribution ofM2p when G is a tree. In this case,
the probability of two independent random paths to intersect in
v ∈ V (G) is precisely (I (v)/n)2. However, this is not the probability
Pr(M2p = v), because v is only selected if it is the first intersection
of the two paths. Define the recursive function:
Z (v) = Z (v,G) :=
(
I (v)
n
)2
−
∑
u ∈P (v)
Z (u), (3)
where P(v) ⊆ V is the progeny set of v , i.e. all vertices which have
a path to v (not including v itself). We can then write
Pr(M2p = v) = Z (v),
and we have found an explicit expression for the distribution in-
duced byM2p . We remark that it is not hard to prove, using simple
induction, that
Z (v) =
(
I (v)
n
)2
−
∑
u ∈N (v)
(
I (u)
n
)2
. (4)
Now suppose that G is a forest. Observe the following:
• The probability that v ∈ V is selected in the first stage is Z (v).
• In every subsequent stage, v will have probability Z (v) to be
selected, provided the two paths did not intersect in previous
stages and v was not marked.
Let Z = Z (G) := ∑u ∈V Z (u) = ∑r ∈S (G)(I (r )/n)2 denote the proba-
bility that in a single stage the two paths intersect. Let Gv be the
graph we get from G after removing all the out-edges of v . Then
Zv = Z (Gv ) is the probability that in a single stage the Two Path
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intersected but none of them went through v , unless v is the inter-
section vertex (this is because v is a root vertex in Gv ). Thus, if we
denote by q(v) the probability that in a single stage the two paths
did not intersect and none of them went through v , then
q(v) ≥ (1 − Zv )(1 − 2I (v)/n).
We conclude that
Pr(M2p = v) =
∞∑
k=1
q(v)kZ (v) = Z (v)1 − q(v) ≥
Z (v)
Zv + 2 I (v)n
. (5)
We will now use this last expression as a baseline for our ‘analytic’
Two Path mechanism, denotedMA2p .
Let G be a DAG. In a forest the influence of one vertex over the
other, I (v,u), is either 1 or 0. This is no longer the case for DAGs. To
account for this difference we alter the function we defined at (3):
Z (v) = Z (v,G) =
(
I (v)
n
)2
−
∑
u ∈N (v)
I (v,u)
(
I (u)
n
)2
;
Z = Z (G) =
∑
u ∈V
Z (u) =
∑
r ∈S (G)
(
I (r )
n
)2
.
Now, our mechanism for monotone DAGs, denotedMA2p , is defined
by the following distribution:
Pr(MA2p (G) = v) =
Z (v)
Zv + 2 I (v)n
, (6)
when G is a monotone DAG; if G is not a monotone DAG, the
mechanism returns ∅.
Proposition 4.2. MechanismMA2p is well-defined and incentive
compatible in the family of monotone DAGs.
We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. For any monotone DAG G and for every v ∈ V (G),
Z − 2 I (v)n ≤ Zv ≤ Z .
Proof. If v is a sink then Zv = Z . Assume then that v is not a
sink. On the one hand, the influence of some of the sinks of G is
lower in Gv , but on the other hand v is an extra sink which was
not in G. Thus,
Zv =
∑
r ∈S (Gv )
(
I (r )|Gv
n
)2
= Z −
∑
r ∈S (G)
[(
I (r )
n
)2
−
(
I (r ) − I (r ,v)I (v)
n
)2]
+
(
I (v)
n
)2
= Z −
∑
r ∈S (G)
2I (r )I (r ,v)I (v) − I2(r ,v)I2(v)
n2
+
(
I (v)
n
)2
= Z − 2 I (v)
n
©­«
∑
r ∈S (G)
I (r ,v) I (r )
n
− 12 ·
I (v)
n
©­«1 +
∑
r ∈S (G)
I2(r ,v)ª®¬ª®¬ .
Now,
∑
r ∈S (G) I (r ,v) = 1 =⇒
∑
r ∈S (G) I2(r ,v) ≤ 1, and by mono-
tonicity
∑
r ∈S (G) I (r ,v)I (r ) ≥ I (v)
∑
r ∈S (G) I (r ,v) = I (v). Hence,
we have,∑
r ∈S (G)
I (r ,v) I (r )
n
− 12 ·
I (v)
n
©­«1 +
∑
r ∈S (G)
I2(r ,v)ª®¬ ≥ 0,
and the upper bound follows.
For the lower bound it is enough to observe that by Cauchy-Schwarz,∑
r ∈S (G)
I (r ,v) I (r )
n
≤
√ ∑
r ∈S (G)
I2(r ,v)
√ ∑
r ∈S (G)
I2(r )/n2 ≤ 1. □
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Since it is clear from (6) that Pr(MA2p =
v) does not depend on the out-edges of v , the mechanism is IC.
To prove that it is well-defined, we need to show that for every
monotone DAG, all the probabilities are non-negative and the sum
of probabilities is at most 1 8. For the former, we use the mono-
tonicity assumption, which means that I (v) > I (u) for all u ∈ N (v).
Hence,
Z (v) =
(
I (v)
n
)2
−
∑
u ∈N (v)
I (v,u)
(
I (u)
n
)2
>
(
I (v)
n
)2
− I (v)
n
∑
u ∈N (v)
I (v,u) I (u)
n
=
(
I (v)
n
)2
− I (v)(I (v) − 1)
n
> 0.
For the latter, we use the lemma.∑
v ∈V
Pr(MA2p (G) = v) =
∑
v ∈V
Z (v)
Zv + 2 I (v)n
≤
∑
v ∈V Z (v)
Z
= 1. □
We are ready to prove the parallel of Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a monotone DAG with s sinks, S ⊆ V (G).
Then,
E[MA2p (G)] ≥ 0.07
n
s
.
Proof. Define, for every r ∈ V ,
Er =
∑
v ∈V
I (r ,v)I (v) Pr(MA2p = v).
Since ∀v,∑r ∈S I (r ,v) = 1,
E[MA2p ] =
∑
v ∈V
I (v) Pr(MA2p = v) =
∑
v ∈V
I (v) Pr(MA2p = v)
∑
r ∈S
I (r ,v)
=
∑
r ∈S
I (r ,v)
∑
v ∈V
I (v) Pr(MA2p = v) =
∑
r ∈S
Er .
It is enough then, to bound Er . Let P(r ) ⊆ V be the progeny of r .
We will prove by induction on |P(r )| that
Er ≥ 12 ·
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) .
When P(r ) = ∅, I (r ) = 1 and by Lemma 4.3,
Er = Pr(MA2p = v) =
1/n2
Zv + 2/n ≥
1
n2Z + 2n
.
In the general case, wewriteEr = I (r ) Pr(MA2p = r )+
∑
v ∈N (r ) I (r ,v)Ev .
Now,
I (r ) Pr(MA2p = r ) =
I (r )Z (r )
Zr + 2 I (r )n
≥ I
3(r ) − I (r )∑v ∈N (r ) I (r ,v)I2(v)
n2Z + 2nI (r ) ,
8If the sum is strictly less than 1, then the rest of the probability goes to ∅.
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while, by induction,∑
v ∈N (r )
I (r ,v)Ev ≥ 12
∑
v ∈N (r )
I (r ,v)I3(v)
n2Zv + 2nI (v) ≥
1
2
∑
v ∈N (r )
I (r ,v)I3(v)
n2Z + 2nI (r ) .
We get,
Er ≥ I
3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) +
∑
v ∈N (r )
I (r ,v)I (v)
n2Z + 2nI (r )
[
1
2 I
2(v) − I (r )I (v)
]
.
(7)
The term in the parenthesis is minimized when I (v) = I (r ), and
Er ≥ I
3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) −
1
2
∑
v ∈N (r )
I (r ,v)I (v)I2(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r )
=
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) −
1
2 ·
I2(r )(I (r ) − 1)
n2Z + 2nI (r ) ≥
1
2 ·
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) .
We proved:
E[MA2p ] ≥
1
2
∑
r ∈S
I3(r )
n2Z + 2nI (r ) .
The last sum is precisely the sumwe got in the proof of Theorem 3.5
in (2), multiplied by 3/4. We continue in exactly the same manner
and get:
E[MA2p ] ≥
3
4 ·
2
9 · 0.43 ·
n
s
≥ 0.07n
s
. □
5 MECHANISM FOR GENERAL GRAPHS
MechanismM2p is defined for all networks, but is incentive-compatible
only on the family of DAGs (see Example 3.2). We will now present
mechanismMG2p , which is based onM2p and which is IC on all
graphs9. The idea is to choose a random ordering of V (G), and
remove all edges from vertices with high index to vertices with
lower index. The resulted graph is clearly acyclic, and we return
the outcome of the running ofM2p on this graph.
1: ≻← random ordering of V (G)
2: for all e = (x ,y) ∈ E(G) do
3: if x ≻ y then
4: E ← E − e
5: end if
6: end for
7: returnM2p (G)
Proposition 5.1. MechanismMG2p is IC for all graphs.
Proof. For every graph G and for every ordering ≻ on V (G),
let F (G,≻) be the resulted DAG after removing from G edges as
described above with ≻ as the ordering. Since every ordering has
the same probability of 1/n!, we get that
Pr(MG2p = v) =
1
n!
∑
≻ is an
order on V
Pr(M2p (F (G,≻))).
It is enough, then, to show that the out-edges of v do not influence
Pr(M2p (F (G,≻))). Indeed, any edge from v to a vertex u such that
9Notice, that in this case, reporting the true edges becomes a weakly dominant strategy
for all vertices.
v ≻ u is not in F (G,≻). The out-edges ofv which remain in F (G,≻)
do not influence Pr(M2p (F (G,≻))), sinceM2p is IC on DAGs. □
Note thatMG2p is not an extension ofM2p , that is, we cannot
claim that in the family of DAGs,MG2p =M2p . In fact, it does not
even have a bounded approximation ratio in the family of trees.
Take, for example, the complete binary tree. After the random
ordering and edges-removal, we will get a forest with about n/2
trees. Thus, the outcome of MG2p on this tree is close to that of
the random mechanism. Since the average influence in the binary
tree is logn, the approximation ratio of MG2p is at least n/logn.
Nevertheless, in the next section we will test this mechanism on
simulated ‘Twitter-like’ networks and see that it gives a reasonable
approximation.
6 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
It has been long known that many real-world networks, and so-
cial networks in particular, feature the property that their degree
distribution follows a power law10 (see, for example, [9, 10]). Net-
works with this property are known as ‘scale-free’ graphs. Several
models have been offered to simulate scale-free graphs in a way
which will resemble the constant growth and self-organising na-
ture of social networks. In this section we present test results of
mechanismM2p on scale-free DAGs, simulated according to the
model of Barabási and Albert ([6]); and results of mechanismMG2p
on scale-free general graphs, simulated according to the model of
Aparicio, Villazón-Terrazas and Álvarez ([4]).
6.1 Tests results ofM2p on scale-free DAGs
The first and perhaps most famous model for the emergence of
scale-free graphs, is that of Barabási and Albert. In their model the
network starts with an initial set of s vertices and no edges. At
each step we add a new vertex to the graph and connect it to k
existing vertices, which are randomly selected according to distri-
bution which is linearly proportionate to the current degree of the
vertices. Thus a vertex with already high degree is more likely to
get more new links (a sort of ‘rich get richer’ phenomenon). This
model was originally defined to generate undirected graphs. By
directing the edges from the new vertex to the old ones, we get a
directed model which is also acyclic. Moreover, the initial set of s
vertices are precisely the sinks of the generated DAG. We used this
model to simulate academic papers’ citation networks, and tested
the working of the Two Path mechanism on these networks. We
have fixed the number of vertices at 10,000 and simulated networks
while changing two parameters: the number of sinks (i.e., size of
the initial set), and the out-degree of each new vertex. We observed
that as we increase the number of sinks, the approximation ratio
of our mechanism worsens. On the other hand, increasing the de-
gree improves the outcome. Notice that this is in accordance to
the reasoning of Theorem 3.5, since a denser DAG with less sinks
is more likely to be balanced. Two representative samples of this
phenomenon can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. In both, each dot repre-
sents an average of 100 random networks. For each network we ran
10Meaning that the fraction of vertices which have in-degree k is proportional to k−λ
where λ > 1 is a parameter of the network.
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the mechanism 100 times and averaged the outcome. Thus, each
dot represents 10,000 runs of the mechanism with the appropriate
network parameters. Figure 1 shows the deterioration of the ratio
when we increase the number of sinks while holding the degree
fixed. Figure 2 shows the improvement of the ratio when we in-
crease the degree while holding the number of sinks fixed.
We also noticed that typically, the approximation ratio was in the
range of 3-10. This implies that in real-world networks, the Two
Path mechanism can be expected to perform much better than the
mathematical bounds we were able to prove.
Figure 1: Ratio vs. Sinks. Out-degree = 10.
Figure 2: Ratio vs. Out-degree. # sinks = 100.
6.2 Test results ofMG2p on scale-free networks
In order to simulate Twitter-like networks, we used the model sug-
gested in [4]. In that paper the authors show that their model is
more suited to simulate the dynamic nature of social networks
than the Barabási-Albert model. In particular, they show that their
model generates graphs which resemble Twitter in a few interest-
ing parameters. In their model, at each step one of the following
happens.
• With probability p a new vertex is added with an out-going edge
to an existing vertex. The target vertex is chosen according to a
distribution linearly proportionate to the current in-degree of
the vertices.
• With probability q a new vertex is added with an in-going edge
from an existing vertex. The source vertex is chosen according
to a distribution linearly proportionate to the current out-degree
of the vertices.
• With probability r a new edge is added between two existing
vertices. The source vertex is chosen according to a distribution
linearly proportionate to the current out-degree of the vertices
and the target vertex is chosen according to a distribution lin-
early proportionate to the current in-degree of the vertices.
Of course, we need to require that p + q + r = 1. In addition, it is
assumed that q < p. We used this model with different parameters
to test mechanismMG2p . Again, we fixed the number of vertices at
10,000 and were interested in the influence of two parameters on the
performance of our mechanism. The first parameter is the average
in-degree in the graph; in the parameters of the model, this is equal
to 1/(p + q)11. The second is the probability of a ‘reverse edge’,
qˆ = q/(p + q), which is the probability of a new vertex to get an
edge. We think of this parameter as some indication of how far the
graph will be from a DAG (although cycles can also be created on
steps where an edge is created between two existing vertices). We
observed as before that an increase in the average degree (meaning,
an increase in the density of the graph) improves the performance
of the mechanism. On the other hand, an increase in qˆ worsens the
average outcome. The reason for that might be that some vertices
reach high influence due to a few ‘lucky’ edges from other high-
influence vertices, while mechanismMG2p performs better when
there is higher correlation between high influence and high in-
degree. Again we show two samples of our tests. Figures 3 and 4
both present the running of the mechanism on simulated networks
with 10,000 vertices. Each dot represents 100 networks which are
tested 100 times each, so a dot is an average of 10,000 outcomes. In
the first figure we show the tests in which we held qˆ fixed while
increasing the average degree, and in the second figure we show
the tests in which we did the opposite.
We see that mechanismMG2p gives a nicely bounded approximation
ratio in most scenarios and we thus expect it to perform well in
real-life social networks.
Figure 3: Ratio vs. Average degree. qˆ = 0.15.
Figure 4: Ratio vs. ‘Reveres edge’ Prob. Average degree = 10.
11At each step a new edge is created. The probability of a new vertex in every step is
p + q , hence the expected average degree will be 1/(p + q).
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